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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, 
Appellant/Defendant. 
Case No. 20050461-CA 
Incarcerated 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from second degree felony convictions entered in a court of record. 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Hale's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
This Court reviews motions to withdraw guilty pleas under and abuse of discretion 
standard of review. See, e ^ , State v. Beckstead. 2004 UT App 338, % 5, 100 P.3d 267, 
cert granted, 109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005). 
Hale preserved this issue by pro se motions (R. 29-30, 36-52, 70; R. 106 at 21-35). 
To the extent any of the issues were not fully preserved, Hale relies on the 
doctrines of exceptional circumstances, plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to properly investigate and the conflict between 
Hale and appointed counsel, and in failing to appoint substitute counsel to litigate the 
motion to withdraw the plea? 
This issue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.. State v. Vessey, 967 
P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App. 1998). 
HaJe preserved this issue pro se, and the presentence report and appointed counsel 
also brought the matter to the trial court's attention (R. 64-65, 70, 74, 75-76; R. 106 at 11-
12,21-22,32-35,43-66). 
To the extent any of the issues were not fully preserved, Hale relies on the 
doctrines of exceptional circumstances, plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Pertinent constitutional provisions and rules are copied in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Mr. Hale with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, one 
count of third degree felony theft by receiving stolen property, six class A misdemeanor 
counts of theft by receiving stolen property, and one count of unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor (R. 1-5). 
Stephen A. Howard of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed to 
represent Hale (R. 11). 
Hale pled guilty to burglary and aggravated assault (R. 18-21),1 and the 
prosecution filed an amended information after the fact (R. 23-28; R. 106 at 4). 
lA copy of the plea form and plea colloquy is in the addendum. 
2 
Hale moved for a continuance of sentencing, indicating his intention to file for 
appointment of new counsel, and a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 29-30). 
Hale moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that they were not entered in a 
knowing and voluntary fashion, because he did not understand the relation of the law to 
the facts, and was coerced to enter the pleas by counsel. He argued that there was no 
factual basis for the pleas, and that defense counsel mis-advised Hale to enter the pleas 
without properly investigating the case, and made misrepresentations to Hale. He 
asserted Rule 11 and numerous cases in support of his motion. Among other things, Hale 
claimed that he was extremely intoxicated, that his breaking into a motor home was a 
class A misdemeanor vehicle burglary, and that he would not have entered the pleas had 
he understood the law and the facts (R. 36-45). His motion for appointment of counsel 
reiterated his claims (R. 46-52). 
The court then appointed conflict counsel, Manny Garcia, to represent Mr. Hale 
(R. 53). 
Garcia moved to continue sentencing, and then moved to withdraw, informing the 
court that the dispute between them centered on Mr. Hale's intention to pursue a claim 
that Garcia felt lacked legal merit - that the second degree felony burglary he pled to was 
a misdemeanor vehicle burglary (R. 64-65; R. 106 at 11-12). At the hearing on this 
motion, Hale requested the appointment of conflict free counsel, arguing that the conflict 
encompassed other issues than just the Shondel issue, such as the degree of the assault he 
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pled to, and Garcia's unwillingness to align himself with Hale's cause (R. 106 at 16). 
Garcia repeatedly interrupted Hale as he was trying to address the problem (R. 106 at 12-
20). The trial court declined to provide new counsel if Hale could not pay for it, and 
required Hale to consult further with Garcia (R. 106 at 12-20). 
Mr. Hale filed a pro se request for judicial notice, informing the court of the 
elements of vehicle burglary under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204, and arguing that the 
assault was at most a third degree felony, because the injuries inflicted were substantial at 
the most, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (R. 68). The notice requested a hearing (R. 
69). 
Hale filed a pro se memorandum regarding his motion to withdraw his plea, noting 
that he was appearing pro se as a result of a serious conflict with Manny Garcia, who 
appeared to be in collusion with Stephen Howard (R. 70). 
A letter from the AP&P agent who was to prepare the presentence report informed 
the court that Hale was intent on withdrawing his plea and had a conflict with his counsel 
(R. 74). 
The hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea began by Mr. Garcia reiterating his 
motion to withdraw, the court requiring him to stand by, Mr. Hale indicating that he did 
not want Mr. Garcia involved in the case at all (R. 106 at 21-22). The court confirmed 
with Hale and Garcia that they had "had some differences in how the case should be 
defended under these circumstances," but did not inquire into the specifics of the conflict 
4 
(R. 106 at 22). Hale continued to complain of Garcia's unwillingness to assert a defense 
on behalf of Hale, characterizing Garcia's performance and ineffective (R. 106 at 32-35). 
Mr. Hale was never placed under oath, but merely argued in support of the 
withdrawal of his pleas, alleging inter alia that he was extremely intoxicated during the 
offenses (R. 106 at 24-39). 
The court denied the motion to withdraw, stating: 
Good. And I'm aware of your argument, Mr. Hale, and I appreciate 
the effort that you have undertaken to present that and applaud you for your 
effort in doing so and my problem is is that as I look through the file, Mr. 
Hale, I find that the plea and the standard and the Rule 11 requirements 
were met and that I find that the plea was knowing and voluntarily entered 
and that based upon that, that's the standard. 
And secondly that the papers that you have filed with the court don't 
indicate that there's a valid basis for withdrawing that plea and I understand 
that you've got disagreements with counsel, but I also find that the 
assistance that you've enjoyed the assistance of counsel in this matter, in 
fact, two separate attorneys, and that I don't find in evidence or basis that 
the counsel has been ineffective. 
So for that basis, Mr. Hale, I'm prepared to deny your motions to set 
aside the pleas that you've entered in this case. 
(R. 106 at 40). 
The court asked Hale if he wanted assistance from Garcia during sentencing, and 
told him Garcia could assist if Hale so desired (R. 106 at 40-41). Before Hale began 
speaking, the prosecutor interjected that the court should not permit Garcia to represent 
Hale after Hale alleged ineffective assistance against him, and that the court should 
conduct a colloquy to insure that Hale's waiver of counsel was proper (R. 106 at 42-43). 
The court asked Garcia regarding anything the court should review with regard to the 
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waiver of counsel or issues, and Garcia moved to withdraw because Hale did not want 
him involved in his case in any way (R. 106 at 43). The court said he would have Garcia 
stand by in case Hale wanted assistance, and then conducted a colloquy with Hale and had 
him complete a waiver of counsel form (R. 106 at 43-50; R. 78). 
During the colloquy, Hale repeatedly indicated that he did not wish to proceed 
without counsel, that he did not want Garcia representing him with a conflict, and that the 
court should appoint new counsel (R. 106 at 50-51). When the court asked Garcia's 
opinion, Garcia indicated that sentencing was a critical stage of the proceedings, that Hale 
should have counsel, and that it was possible to have alternate counsel appointed (R. 106 
at 51). The court agreed with this and offered to obtain conflict free counsel for purposes 
of sentencing, but Hale declined and represented himself at sentencing (R. 106 at 52-53). 
The court required Garcia to stand by (R. 106 at 55). 
The court sentenced Hale to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years, to run 
consecutively to his other prison sentence (R. 76). 
Hale filed a timely pro se notice of appeal (R. 79-80). 
Present counsel for Hale moved for a 23B remand to document Hale's claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, but this Court denied the motion on January 9, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no trial in this case. The relevant legal facts are in the procedural 
history, which is fully discussed in the Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
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Disposition section of this brief, supra. 
A letter from the victim, Terry Ford, describes the incident underlying Hale's 
convictions, as follows: 
On or about September 28, 2005,1 was involved in an incident with 
Mr. Hale. Late at night I was awakened by the noise of someone in my 
motor home. I went outside and discovered Mr. Hale inside the vehicle and 
gathering property to be removed. 
During the confrontation that ensued we got into a bit of an 
altercation in which we wrestled to the ground with Mr. Hale falling on top 
of me. When I hit the ground my left should hit full force and immediate 
pain was felt. Mr. Hale got up, kicking me in the face, escaping my grasp 
and ran off into the night. His friend remained behind and was later caught. 
I suffered pain in my shoulder and scrapes on my face. 
I initially thought I had bruised my shoulder and elbow. When the 
pain did not subside, I visited my doctor in mid October. I received an MRI 
in November and was referred to Dr. Holstrom at Cottonwood Hospital 
where I was informed surgery was required. 
I had surgery to correct the Rotator Cuff Tear late in December. At 
this point I am still recovering and expect to fully recover towards the end 
of the year. This has been a slow and painful process and I still do not have 
full use of my arm and suffer a lot of pain. I am told this is normal for this 
type of injury. 
(R. 99-105). 
His victim impact statement similarly indicates, 
Defendant broke into motorhome, I caught him. We wrestled to the 
ground and he landed on me, got up, kicked me in the fac and ran off. I 
suffered a torn rotator cuff. 
7 
(R. 96).2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Hale's motion to withdraw the 
guilty pleas, because the pleas were taken in violation of Rule 11 and the constitutions. 
The entry of the pleas failed to establish a factual or legal basis for the pleas. 
Ford's letter and victim impact statement confirm that Hale did not intentionally inflict 
the rotator cuff injury, that Ford suffered no broken elbow, and that Ford expected a full 
recovery. Thus, there was no factual basis for the aggravated assault charge, which was 
not properly defined in the entry of the plea. The burglary which Hale committed was at 
most a class A vehicle burglary, and he was entitled to the accurate lesser charge under 
the Shondel doctrine. Trial counsel should have, but did not, accurately advise Hale of 
the foregoing, or that his intoxication was a defense to all of the offenses charged, and to 
at least one of the offenses to which Hale pled. Hale's unknowing and uninformed entry 
of the pleas in these circumstances was involuntary, in violation of the constitutions and 
Rule 11. 
The trial court should have fully inquired into the conflict between Garcia and 
Hale as soon as it arose, and appointed replacement counsel, when it was apparent that 
Garcia was not willing to represent Hale. Garcia's failure to assert the valid bases for 
withdrawal of Hale's pleas was both plainly deficient and prejudicial, although Hale 
2
 A full copy of the victim impact statement, letter and attachments is in the 
addendum. 
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should not be required to show prejudice to obtain relief, given the conflict between the 
two of them, which the trial court should have recognized and cured. 
This Court should remand this case to the trial court for withdrawal of the pleas 
and appointment of conflict-free counsel. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING HALE'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 provides, in relevant part: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if 
it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the 
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction[.] 
It is axiomatic constitutional law that pleas cannot be knowing and voluntary and 
comport with the Due Process Clauses of the Utah and federal constitutions if the record 
does not demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and elements of the 
offenses to which he pled. See, e ^ , State v. Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440,443-444 and n.2 
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(Utah 1983) (pleas are not constitutionally voluntary unless the record of plea entry 
reflects defendant's accurate understanding of the nature and elements of the offense, 
especially the necessary mens red); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988) 
(plea is not constitutionally voluntary if defendant does not understand the nature of the 
charge). 
A. THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED. 
To justify the conviction of second degree felony aggravated assault, the record of 
the entry of the plea should establish Hale's assent to the following facts and elements: 
that Hale intentionally caused serious bodily injury ( "bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death") to Ford while assaulting 
him. See Utah Code Ann. §§ Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102 and 103;3 State v. Howell 
3Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 provides: 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another 
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
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554 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1976) (aggravated assault requires proof of specific intent to 
inflict serious bodily injury). 
The plea form stated the following with regard to the elements: 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or not contest) 
are: 
- enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft 
- commit an assault as defined in 76-5-102 and causes serious bodily injury to 
another[.] 
(R. 18 (back side)). 
The plea form stated the following with regard to the factual basis for the pleas: 
- entered a motor home to commit a theft; 
got into an altercation with an individual, causing a torn rotator cuff and a 
broken elbow[.] 
(R. 19). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 provides: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (10) defines serious bodily injury as "bodily injury that 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." 
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During the plea colloquy, trial counsel stated the following factual basis: 
Mr. Hale entered a motor home which technically under the case law 
qualifies as a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft, and upon leaving 
the motor home was confronted by the owner. An altercation ensued during 
which the owner suffered a torn rotator cuff and broken elbow. 
(R. 106 at 5-6). 
The court found the pleas to be knowingly and voluntarily entered, but did not find 
a factual basis for the pleas (R. 106 at 8). 
The entry of the aggravated assault plea was legally deficient, because neither the 
plea form nor the plea colloquy reflect the legal elements or a factual basis essential to the 
conviction - that Hale intended to cause serious bodily injury to Ford, which is defined as 
"bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10). 
The victim impact statement and letter from the victim, Terry Ford, establishes that 
the injuries to his rotator cuff and elbow were not intentionally inflicted by Hale, but 
occurred during a scuffle, when Hale fell on top of Ford (R. 106 at 62 R. 96-105). This 
letter also indicates that Ford's only diagnosis was a torn rotator cuff (not a broken 
elbow), and Ford's expectation of a full recovery (R. 96-105, R. 106 at 62). Thus, the 
aggravated assault conviction is without a factual basis. See, e.g., Howell, supra. 
Because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 and the constitutions in the 
entry of this plea, and because the legal elements and factual basis for the plea are 
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inadequate, there is good cause for the withdrawal of this plea as a matter of law, and this 
Court should so hold. See, e ^ , State v. Mills. 898 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Utah 1995) (failure 
to comply with Rule 11 constitutes good cause for the withdrawal of a guilty plea). 
B. THE BURGLARY CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED. 
To justify the conviction of second degree felony burglary, the record of the entry 
of the plea should establish Hale's assent to the following facts and elements: that Hale 
entered or remained unlawfully in a building which constitutes a dwelling with the intent 
to commit a theft. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202.4 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 provides: 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with intent to 
commit a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection (1) 
4This statute provides: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5: or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in 
the building. 
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shall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other offense. 
It is well established under Utah law that the statute most specific to a given 
offense governs, see, e ^ , State v. Lowder. 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994), and that when 
two statutes arguably apply to one set of facts, the defendant is entitled to be convicted 
under the rule of lenity, to the lesser offense, e.g.. State v. Shondel 453 P.2d 146, 147 
(Utah 1969). 
In State v. Cates. 2000 WL 33244184, 2000 UT App 256, the appellant claimed 
that his conviction for second degree felony burglary of a dwelling could not stand, 
because the camping trailer he broke into constituted a building, rather than a dwelling, 
and justified a lesser conviction of third degree felony burglary. See id. In rejecting the 
argument, this Court relied on State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992), wherein the 
Court held that a mountain cabin which was occupied less than fifty percent of the time 
was properly characterized as a dwelling, as cabins are typically expected to be used for 
overnight lodging. See kL 
Neither Cates nor Cox controls, as neither appellant argued for a vehicle burglary 
conviction under the Shondel doctrine, or under the law requiring the application of the 
most specific statute, e ^ , Lowder, supra. 
Assuming arguendo that Cates and Cox applied, the motor home at issue here was 
parked next to a home (e.g. R. 4), and was obviously not presumptively used for 
overnight lodging on the facts of this case. 
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Because the facts of this case justify a vehicle burglary conviction, e.g., Shondel 
supra, and because Hale was not so informed prior to pleading guilty to the greater 
offense of second degree burglary (R. 36-52), his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily 
entered. See Copeland, supra, 
C. HALE'S INTOXICATION JUSTIFIES WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEAS. 
Trial counsel did not inform Hale that his intoxication was a legal defense to the 
charged offenses (e.g. R. 36-52). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 provides: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge 
unless such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is 
an element of the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence 
establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk 
because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a 
prosecution for that offense. 
A person may raise this defense, provided that the offense charged has a mens rea 
higher than recklessness, and that the person was so intoxicated that he could not form the 
intent to commit the offense charged. R&, State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998). 
Hale was originally charged with aggravated burglary, which required proof of 
specific intent to assault Terry Ford at the time of Hale's entry of or remaining in a 
building (e.g. R. 1, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 and 203). He was also charged with 
multiple counts of theft by receiving, which required proof of specific intent to deprive 
and knowledge or probable knowledge of the stolen nature of the property (e.g. R. 2-3, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408). He was also charged with possession of drug 
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paraphernalia, which required either proof of use, or possession with specific intent to 
use, the paraphernalia (e.g. R. 4; Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5). 
Thus, his intoxication was a valid defense to all offenses charged. See § 76-2-306; 
Chacon, supra. 
Trial counsel did not accurately inform Mr. Hale of the elements of the offenses to 
which he pled guilty, and did not inform Hale that his intoxication negated the level of 
intent necessary to establish at least some of the offenses of conviction (e.g. R. 36-52). 
Hale's burglary conviction required proof that he intended to commit a theft when 
he entered or remained in a building (e.g. R. 23, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202). Hale's 
aggravated assault conviction required proof that Hale intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury to Ford (e.g. R. 26; Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102 and 103). Hale never intended to 
injure Ford, and likely could not have intended to commit a theft when he entered or 
remained in the motor home, given his intoxication (R. 36-52). 
Because the entry of Hale's pleas was caused by Mr. Howard's failure to advise 
Hale correctly, and because Hale would not have pled guilty, but would have gone to trial 
in the absence of this objectively deficient performance by trial counsel (e.g. R. 36-52), 
Hale has established ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the entry of the pleas, which 
justifies withdrawal of the pleas. See, e ^ , State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 22 95 P.3d 276 
(to justify withdrawal of plea on basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 
show a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial in the absence of counsel's 
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ineffectiveness). 
D. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THESE ISSUES ON THEIR MERITS. 
Because Hale's pro se pleadings raised Rule 11, and argued that the pleas were 
entered unknowingly and involuntarily and without an understanding of the relationship 
between the law and the facts and without adequate advice by counsel (R. 36-52), and 
because the trial court expressly ruled that the pleas were knowing and voluntary, entered 
with effective assistance of counsel, and entered in compliance with Rule 11 (R. 106 at 
40), this Court should hold that the issues raised in this point were properly preserved. 
See Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 822-23 (compliance with Rule 11 was preserved by general 
reservation of issue by counsel, followed by court's asking defense counsel and opposing 
counsel, and ruling that Rule 11 was satisfied), supra. 
To the extent that the issues raised in this point may not have been fully preserved, 
this Court should nonetheless correct the errors on appeal under the exceptional 
circumstances, plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare 
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, If 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
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hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
By reviewing the record of this case, this Court can readily determine that Hale's 
guilty pleas cannot stand because they were entered in clear violation of Rule 11 and the 
constitutions. The errors are plain on the face of the record and prejudicial. See 
Eldredge, supra. 
The facts that Hale is currently sentenced to prison on the basis of these illegal 
sentences, and that Hale was trying so hard to raise his issues on his own, when the two 
lawyers appointed to represent him were unwilling to listen to him and assert his 
legitimate claims, justify setting aside the convictions under the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine. See Nelson-Waggoner, supra. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
Article I § 12, Hale must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below 
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient 
performance was prejudicial. See ej*. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert. 
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e.g.. State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at ^ 10, 67 P.3d 
1005. When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes 
objectively deficient performance, which will not be excused by the courts with 
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hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) 
(trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the 
client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not conceivably have 
been valid trial strategy). 
The issues raised in this point - the legal definitions of the crimes to which Mr. 
Hale pled, and the necessary factual bases therefor, Hale's defenses to those crimes, and 
the legality of his pleas in light of the foregoing, were not snap issues that had to be 
decided in the heat of battle with the jury present, but could and should have been 
researched and studied before Mr. Howard advised Hale to enter the pleas, and before Mr. 
Garcia moved to withdraw from Hale's case. 
Because the entry of Hale's pleas was caused by Mr. Howard's failure to advise 
Hale correctly, and because Hale would not have pled guilty, but would have gone to trial 
in the absence of this objectively deficient performance by trial counsel (e.g. R. 36-52), 
Hale has established ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the entry of the pleas, which 
justifies withdrawal of the pleas. See, e ^ , State v. Dean. 2004 UT 63, If 22 95 P.3d 276 
(to justify withdrawal of plea on basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 
show a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial in the absence of counsel's 
ineffectiveness). 
Garcia should have reviewed Mr. Hale's pleadings, the plea colloquy, the plea 
form, and the relevant law, and asserted the points made in this point of Hale's brief. His 
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failure to do so because he disagreed with Mr. Hale's argument about the burglary 
constituting vehicle burglary constitutes objectively deficient and prejudicial 
performance. Compare, e.g.. State v. Moritzkv, 771 P.2d 688, 691-93 (Utah App. 1989) 
(trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in obtaining a jury instruction on defense of 
habitation which lacked helpful presumption provided in amended defense of habitation 
statute, resulting the denial of a fair trial and the need for a new trial). 
Failure to comply with Rule 11, particularly in this constitutionally controlled area 
of the law, constitutes good cause for withdrawal of the pleas as a matter of law. See, 
e.g.. State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1994). 
Garcia's failure to support Mr. Hale's motion to withdraw his pleas with the 
readily available evidence and law discussed above was both objectively deficient and 
prejudicial. Had counsel presented the evidence and the law, there is a reasonable 
probability of a different result — that the trial court would have granted the motion to 
withdraw the pleas. See, e.g.. Parsons, supra. 
Accordingly, this Court should remand this matter to the trial court and order that 
court to permit Hale to withdraw his pleas. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FULLY INVESTIGATE 
AND CURE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HALE AND GARCIA 
FURTHER JUSTIFIES WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEAS 
AND REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 12 of the 
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Utah Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g. 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 698 (1984). 
"The accused is entitled to the assistance of a competent member of the Bar, 
who demonstrates a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the 
defendant and who will assert such defenses as are available to him under 
the law and consistent with the ethics of the profession." "The failure of 
such representation constitutes a departure from due process of law." 
State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533-34 (Utah App. 1997)(citation omitted). 
[A]n attorney is required to: advocate the defendant's cause, avoid conflicts 
of interest, "consult with the defendant on important decisions[,] and keep 
the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution." 
Id. at 533 (citations omitted). 
When a trial court becomes aware of a conflict between a criminal defendant and 
appointed counsel, the trial court must thoroughly investigate the conflict. See, e,g., State 
v. Vessev, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App. 1998). While the court has discretion in 
deciding whether to replace appointed counsel, if the court's inquiry prior to this decision 
is inadequate, this is error perse. See id. As the Court explained in State v. Pursifell 
746 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987), 
When a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, the court must 
make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the 
defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary to 
determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed 
attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires 
substitution or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right 
would be violated but for substitution. Even when the trial judge suspects 
that the defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely to 
manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial, perfunctory 
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questioning is not sufficient. 
Id. at 273 (citation omitted). 
In the event that the record establishes that counsel should have been removed, 
then reversal is in order. Vessey, 967 P.2d at 962-63. 
In the instant matter, the conflict between Mr. Hale and Mr. Garcia was repeatedly 
brought to the trial court's attention by Hale, Garcia, and the presentence report 
investigator ((R. 64-65, 70, 74, R. 106 at 11-20, 32-35). 
At the hearing on Garcia's motion to continue and withdraw, the court ascertained 
that the conflict from Garcia's perspective was that Hale was insisting on raising a claim 
that Garcia felt lacked legal merit, and from Hale's perspective encompassed other issues, 
such as the degree of the assault he pled to, and Garcia's unwillingness to align himself 
with Hale's cause (R. 106 at 16). Garcia repeatedly interrupted Hale as he was trying to 
address the problem (R. 106 at 12-20). 
At the next hearing, prior to resolving Hale's motion to withdraw his pleas, the 
court confirmed with Hale and Garcia that they had "had some differences in how the 
case should be defended under these circumstances," but did not inquire into the specifics 
of the conflict (R. 106 at 22). 
This constituted per se error under Pursifell supra. 
The error was also prejudicial, because the conflict between Hale and Garcia 
justified Garcia's removal. Garcia's motions to withdraw were based on his disagreement 
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with Hale's vehicle burglary argument (R. 64-65; R. 106 at 11-12). Garcia's position was 
legally unfounded, and did nothing to resolve or address Hale's other claims which 
justified the withdrawal of his pleas. See Point I, supra. 
Because Garcia was performing in an objectively deficient and prejudicial manner, 
and was not advising Hale properly, and was not willing to align himself with and assert 
the rights of Hale, he was not functioning as the counsel to whom Hale was entitled. See, 
e.g., Strickland and Classon, supra. 
Because the trial court's error in failing to inquire into the conflict between Hale 
and Garcia was not just per se, but was also prejudicial, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's ruling denying the motion to withdraw the pleas. Compare State v. Pursifell, 746 
P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1987) (finding trial court's inquiry marginally adequate, and 
holding that constitution did not require removal of counsel and that trial court did not 
abuse discretion, because counsel may have been adequately prepared for trial and did not 
need client's input about discovery motion); and Vessey (remanding for hearing on 
whether trial court's error in failing to investigate conflict required reversal), supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Hale's convictions and remand this matter to the 
trial court for withdrawal of his pleas. 
Respectfully submitted on February. _, 2006. 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
Constitution of Utah Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, 
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in 
violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemean 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture 
with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be 
used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, 
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, 
ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in 
violation of this act. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person under 
18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person making the delivery is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine, 
handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the 
advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates this 
subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(I) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably 
believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control 
of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is 
capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, 
or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control 
over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily 
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic 
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing 
information in a form capable of being preserved. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense; however, if 
recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is 
unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a 
prosecution for that offense. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another 
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b)theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in 
the building. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from 
a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is 
not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under Section 
76-1-601. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with intent to commit a felony or theft 
is guilty of a burglary of a vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection (1) shall not preclude a 
charge for a commission of any other offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
' *' A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from 
the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of an 
actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense 
charged; or 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used 
or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative 
of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property and fails to require the 
seller or person delivering the property to: 
(I) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next 
to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of 
Subsection (2)(c) is presumed to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing 
it to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the 
defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or 
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, 
employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, 
received, concealed, or withheld the property without obtaining the information required 
in Subsection (2)(d), then the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the 
property bought, received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as defined in 
Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(I) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, exchange, or 
possession of personal property on condition of selling the same 
property back again to the pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by taking chattel mortgage security on 
the property and takes or receives the personal property into his possession and who sells 
the unredeemed pledges; or 
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or in trade for other personal 
property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of 
the property. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, 
or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty 
by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to 
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A 
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other 
than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, 
the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right 
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if 
so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a 
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-
13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other 
charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement 
being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the 
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(I) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the 
right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any 
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
103. 
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. 
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient 
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
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sentencing alternatives, including incarceration, probation, fines, community service, restitution, etc. 
The Victim Impact Statement is only one of the factors the court considers in imposing a sentence. 














Sentencing Date: 03/28/2005 
Judge: Royal I Hansen 
Attorney: Christopher G Bown 
NOTE: Please be advised that the information contained in the Victim Impact Statement (including bills or receipts 
containing your address or telephone number), by Court Order, may be viewed by the defendant either at the time of 
sentencing, or at any subsequent review of sentence. Feel free to delete your address and phone number from the 
documents you submit. 
1. Brief description of crime in which you were involved. ^T)c T&ncPcMJ" f"rN/»e inh) 
k,c )<,•'" r-~>e / /> ML 
Jure ny<£ f-gi\ orf L Ss>(£rvP a -/ot/- /v / ' c i T ^ I - 8L 
2a. As a result of this crime, were you physically injured? 
2b. Did you need medical treatment for these injuries? 
3. If this case involved sexual abuse, do you request that the defendant 
be tested for HIV? 
4. Were you emotionally injured as a result of this crime? 
5. Have you received any counseling or therapy as a result of this crime? 
6. Has this crime affected your ability to earn a living? 
7. Has this crime in any way affected your lifestyle or your family's lifestyle? 
8. Are there any other effects of this crime which are now being experienced 
by you or your family? 












N o X 
No A 
Yes Y* No 
Page 2 of2 
rki 
• - o 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT 
/ ^ o o -
9. Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of medical treatment received: S V^X "I ^ 
(enclose copies of all bills you have received). 
Anticipated expenses: (enclose doctor's statement). $ 
10. Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of counseling or therapy: $ ~ Q — 
(enclose copies of all bills you have received). 
11. Loss of wages to date: $ 
Anticipated loss of wages: $
 w 
Does your employer pay wages when you are in court? Yes No X 
What are your hourly wages? $ 
Please enclose a letter from your employer if you have lost wages or benefits. 
12. Did you suffer any monetary loss or property damage as a result of this crime? Yes X No 
If yes, please state amount. $ \ 1 s ^ 
13. Did insurance cover any of the expenses you have had as a result of this crime? Yes No V 
If yes, please specify the amount and type of insurance coverage, 
and attach a statement from your insurance. 
IF YOU WISH TO EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, 
PLEASE DO SO ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF 8-1/2" x 11" PAPER. 
14. How.do you feel about the putcome of this case? 
-J- A/c: fie} W<t O ^ , 
7 >yr^ in a. / r i n,/ f.n; vm 4hu y Crs /) / ^ rOc vv 
h ^ i * Q f?> 3'(/r»i t'Mpai't. 
15. Even though sentencing is determined by law (depending upon the particular crime), the court h&s 
choices within legal guidelines to impose sentence. Accordingly, your suggestions and 
recommendations regarding sentencing are important. Please state what punishments you believe 
the defendant should receive. ZX° llcxux d o XA. '*•/?•£•/ / n jn£ 
f><jncd>\ m?/\i prtcesij i'S ih?K ex ccrc^ch^ p r e c o x '? 
5 u re y 
Date Signature ' 
Please mail this form to the office of the District Attorney of Salt Lake County, Witness Assistance 
Unit, 2001 South State S3700, Salt Lake City UT 84190-1210. 
If for any reason, you do not wish to fill out this form, please check here , date and sign above, and 
return this form to the above address. 
Page 2 of2 nn 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
Salt Lake County 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY S A L T L A K E 
COUNTY 
March 2, 2005 
Terry Ford 
Re: State ofUiah 
vs. Joshua S Hale 
DAO# 4018689 
The above-named case is completed and a sentencing hearing is now scheduled for the 
defendant. You are not required to attend this hearing, but you may if you wish to. You are 
welcome to contact this office after the sentencing date to find out the defendant's sentence. If 
you do decide to attend, please call the court the afternoon before to confirm the date and time of 
the hearing. Please find below the scheduled sentencing information, as well as the court's phone 
number. 
Sentencing before the Honorable Royal I Hansen 
03/28/2005 @ 8:30 AM 
Court Phone #(801) 565-5721 
A Victim Impact Statement is enclosed so you may provide the judge with information for 
sentencing considerations. Please return this form as soon as possible so that the judge has 
sufficient time to review your comments. If the form enclosed does not meet your needs, please 
feel free to express your feelings in a letter to the judge, and return it with the form. A probation 
officer may be in contact with you to get further information regarding this crime. This officer 
will be compiling a report to give to the judge prior to the sentencing of the defendant. We 
would like to fully thank you for your cooperation and assistance in the prosecution of this 
matter. Should you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me at the 
phone number listed below. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney 
Salt Lake County 
Witness Coordinator 
Enclosure 
2001 South State Street. S3700 Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84190-1210 Teleohone (8011 468-3422 Fax (801 > 468-2642 
Terry Ford 
101 0 n u i x 
March 17. 2005 
Dear Mr. Yocum, 
RECEIVED 
MAR 2 1 2005 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
GC JUSTICE 
Please find enclosed a victim impact statement as requested by your office. 
On or about Sept 28, 2005,1 was involved in an incident with Mr. Hale. 
Late at night I was awakened by the noise of someone in my motor home. I 
went outside and discovered Mr. Hale inside the vehicle and gathering 
property to be removed. 
During the confrontation that ensued we got into a bit of an altercation in 
which we wrestled to the ground with Mr. Hale falling on top of me. When 
I hit the ground my left shoulder hit full force and immediate pain was felt. 
Mr. Hale got up, kicking me in the face, escaping my grasp and ran off into 
the night. His friend remained behind and was later caught. I suffered pain 
in my shoulder and scrapes on my face. 
I initially thought I had bruised my shoulder and elbow. When the pain did 
not subside, I visited my doctor in mid October. I received an MRI in 
November and was referred to Dr Holmstrom at Cottonwood Hospital where 
I was informed surgery was required. 
I had surgery to correct the Rotator Cuff Tear late in December. At this 
point I am still recovering and expect to fully recover towards the end of the 
year. This has been a slow and painful process and I still do not have full 
use of my arm and suffer a lot of pain. I am told this is normal for this type 
of injury. 
Unfortunately, my medical bills to date have been turned into my insurance 
company and I cannot locate the copies at this time so the bills will not be 
available for a while. Also, treatment is not yet complete as I am still in 
Physical Therapy. The amounts listed on the Impact statement are just 
conservative estimates. I also requested a letter from my doctor explaining 
the injury but it has not arrived. 
Later in the evening of the incident, I was again visited by a thief. Someone 
threw a brick through my truck window and stole my laptop out of my truck. 
I cannot prove that this was the work of Mr. Hale but have no reason to 
suspect otherwise at this point. 
I originally did not believe anything was taken from the motor home but 
later discovered that some things were taken and some damage was done. 
It appears that Mr. Hale broke some paneling and tore out an electrical box 
in the vehicle while he was trying to remove a portable TV. I also noticed 
that the remote controls were missing for the TV's. Perhaps he put them in 
his pocket, I don't know. Additionally, a night vision scope was missing 
and a pair of binoculars. 
This accounts for the amounts listed on the Impact statement. 
As far as punishment goes I prefer to leave that to the judgment of the court. 
I am not a vindictive person, but also not a bleeding heart. I have been hurt 
and I am still angry. I do believe in taking responsibility for ones actions. I 
guess my feelings would be to help the young main be productive if the odds 
were for that working out. But if he is one who has spent these several 
months doing nothing and showing no attempt to turn around well put 
him where he can't keep hurting. I think in mat case he has already made 
his decision. 
Thank you for yourtime in reading this. 
Terry Ford 
i _ jk. 
Jfft^ SELECTMED FLUS-
I H C ^ Produce oJIHC Health Plans 
Health Care Coverage From Intermountain Health Care 
4646 W Lake Park Blvd , PO Box 30192 
Safe Lake City, UT 84130-0192 
In Salt Lake 442-5038 Elsewhere (800) 538-5038 
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», ttOVCCT Of SERVICE 
». CLAIM* 
• DATC PROCESS© 
• EMPlOYSt GROUP 








m 01/05/2005a 01/21/2005 
«OK 01/01/2005a 12/31/2005 
S IS NOT A BILL 
11/21/2005 MANUAL THERAPY 
H/21 /2005 ELECTRIC STIMULATION THERAPY 
BILLED 
CHARGES 
4 0 . 9 8 




2 4 . 2 8 
1 2 . 9 0 
1 9 . 4 2 
1 0 . 3 2 
219.85 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
4 . 8 6 
2 . 5 8 
. N O T COVERED. 
CHARGES 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
TOTALS 
7 3 5 . 1 3 4 6 0 . 3 1 U7TO 5 4 . 9 7 0 . 0 0 
MEDICAL DEDUCTSlf, TO DATE: 
MEDICAL OUT O f POOCH MAXIMUM, TO DATE: 
MENIAL HEALTH D£DUCT»l£. TO DATE: 
MENTAL HEALTH OUT OF POCKET MAXIMUM, TO DATE: 
PREFERRED 

















NA - . 
NA TOTAL MEMBER RESPONSIBIUTY 5 1 5 . 2 8 
EDOCTlftlE AND OUT-OF -POCKET MAXIMUM AMOUNTS LISTED Hf tE AtE SUBJECT TO CHANGE DUE TO CLAIM ADJUSTMENTS A N D / O t THE ORDER IN WHICH ClAJMS ARE RECEIVED. 





niTrl ^tLfc(- l MED 1 ^ ^u 
lMCm A Product o/IHC Health Plans 
Health Care Coverage from Intermounta'm Health Care 
4 6 4 6 W Loke Parle Blvd , PO Box 30192 
Salt Lake City, UT 841 30-0192 
In Salt Lake 442 5038 Elsewhere (800) 538-5038 
M.II.I.I.I..I.I.I...II..I 
IWitiin1 ATION OF BENEFITS 
RETAIN THIS COPY FOR TOUR RKORDS (A FEE W I U BE CHARGED FOR DUPLICATE COPIES) 
• ^ FORDJERRY L 
• SUBSCMBER 
• SUfcSCUBERi 
• PROVKXKOF '>«V1CE 
• OA1MI 
• DATE PROCESSED 
». EMPlOYBtGRCXIP 
> QATE?5| OF S£8V!a 
• PtANYEAR 






FROM. 0 1 / 0 5 / 2 0 0 ^ 01 /21 /2005 
^ 0 1 / 0 1 / 2 0 0 ^ 12/31/2005 
IS IS NOT A BILL 




CCPAr COINSURANCE NOT COVERED 
CHARGES 
01/12/2005 MANUAL THERAPY 
01/12/2005 ELECTRIC STIMULATION THERAPY 
01/14/2005 THERAPEUTIC EXERCISES 
01/14/2005 MANUAL THERAPY 
01/14/2005 ELECTRIC STIMULATION THERAPY 
01/19/2005 THERAPEUTIC EXERCISES 
01/19/2005 MANUAL THERAPY 
01/19/2005 ELECTRIC STIMULATION THERAPY 
01/21/2005 THERAPEUTIC EXERCISES 
i n i i U I H U i l i r a i l l TOTALS 
4 0 . 9 8 
2 7 . 9 9 
109 .56 
4 0 . 9 8 
2 7 . 9 9 
109 .56 
4 0 . 9 8 















































0 . 0 0 1 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 .00 ! 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
o.oo; 
0 . 0 0 
. _ MEDICAL DIDUCTmil, TO DATE 
MEDICAL OUT O f POCKET MAXIMUM, TO 0ATE 
MENIAL HEALTH OEDUCTBLE, TO DATE 
ENIA1 HEALTH OUT O f POCKET MAXIMUM, TO DATE 
PREFERRED 


















IMA I TOTAL MEMBER RESPONSIBILITY 5 1 5 . 2 8 
JCTWLE ANO OUT-Of-POCKET MAXIMUM AMOUNTS LISTED HERE AIE SUftJECT TO CHANOC DUE TO CIAIM ADJUSTMENTS AND/OR THE ORDER IN WHICH CUIMS ARE RECEIVED. 




r U1TJ ~ 
I H C A Product of IHC Health Plans 
Health Care Coverage From Intermountain Health Care 
4646 W Lake Park Blvd., P.O. Box 30192 
SablokeCfyUT 84130-0192 
In Sol! Lake 442-5038 Elsewhere (800) 538-5038 
RETAIN THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS (A FEE W I U BE CHARGED FOR DUPLICATE COPIES) 
• PAnENT FORDJERRY L 
• SUBSOftER 
• SUBSCRIBER* 
• PROVCCR Of S£RV*C£ 
• OAJM* 
• DAT€ PROCESSED 
• EMPLOYER GfiOUP 








FROM. 01/05/2005a 01/21/2005 
no* 01/01/2005o 12/31/2005 
IS IS NOT A BILL 
kND DESCRIPTION OF 5ERVICES 
H/05 /2005 PT EVALUATION 
H /05 /2005 THERAPEUTIC EXERCISES 
)1 /05/2005 MANUAL THERAPY 
M/05 /2005 ELECTRIC STIMULATION THERAPY 
M/05 /2005 ELECTRODES, PAIR 
)1 /10 /2005 THERAPEUTIC EXERCISES 
)1 /10 /2005 MANUAL THERAPY 
)1 /10 /2005 ELECTRIC STIMULATION THERAPY 
) 1/12/2005 THERAPEUTIC EXERCISES 
M l i i n M U M l H I f TOTALS 
BILLEDr 
CHARGES 
8 8 . 9 5 
7 3 . 0 4 
4 0 . 9 8 
2 7 . 9 9 
2 0 . 0 0 
1 0 9 . 5 6 
4 0 . 9 8 
2 7 . 9 9 
1 0 9 . 5 6 
- ELIGIBLE. 
CHARGES 
6 8 . 0 1 
5 2 . 2 4 
2 4 . 2 8 
1 2 . 9 0 
0 . 0 0 
7 8 . 3 6 
2 4 . 2 8 
1 2 . 9 0 
7 8 . 3 6 
PLAN PAID j 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
DEDUCTIBLE-
6 8 . 0 1 
5 2 . 2 4 
2 4 . 2 8 
1 2 . 9 0 
0 . 0 0 
7 8 . 3 6 
2 4 . 2 8 
1 2 . 9 0 
7 8 . 3 6 
COPAY-
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
COINSURANCE 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
NOT COVERED 
CHARGES 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
o.oo i 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
o.oo ! 
MEDICAL D£DUCTBL£, TO DATE; 
MEDICAL OUT OF POCKET MAXIMUM, TO DATE: 
MENTAL HEALTH DEDUCTBLE, TO DATE: 



















n rvrv ! 
0.00 
N A 
N A TOTAL MEMBER RESPONSIBILITY 515 .28 
DUCTIBIE AND OUT-OF-POCKET MAXIMUM AMOUNTS USTED HERE ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE DUE TO CLAIM ADJUSTMENTS AND/OR THE ORDER IN WHICH CLAIMS ARE RECEIVED. 
EXPLANATION OF CODES 
ORTHOPEDIC SPEU/-.wfY GROU^'ToSH ' A z ^ i r 
5848 SOUTH 300 EAST 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
IHC 
A SERVICE OF INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE 
|CAnDiJbMBr:R 
3789-PHD 
PLEASE SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION PAGE: 1 
ON THE BACK OF*THIS STATEMENT 
I j Plejse check box it your addiess has changed 
dn6 pio\ ide \our new address on the back 
' PAY ON OR BEFORE 
03/13/05 




| | l l l n l n l i l M . l i | t M . I , l , l l H . . l . l n . l l . I . l . l . . l i l . l . u l l n l 
TERRY LYNN FORD 
543 
AMOUNT ENCLOSE" S 
PLEASE WRITE YOUR ACCT. # ON YOUR CHECK AND MAKE PAYABLE TO 
I I M I M L L I L , , ! ! , , , ! : ! ! : ! . . : ! ! ^ ^ ! . , , ! , ! , ! , ! , , , ! , I , ! ! , , ! 
IHC PHYSICIAN GROUP 
P.O. BOX 79052 
PHOENIX, AZ 85062-9052 
133fl3Q0DSM30DSMfciflfl2MDSMtaa2MDD21S733 
To insure proper credit, detach and return above portion in the enclosed envelope. 
T1EIMT: TERRY LYNN FORD ACCOUNT #: 543-5468824 
'OICE NUMBER: 21522851 
DVIDER: HOLMSTROM 
ifqes 
28/04 ARTHROSCOP ROTATOR CUFF REPR 2200 .00 
28/04 SHOULDER ARTHROSCOPY/SURGERY 1546 . 00 
TOTAL CHARGES 3 746 .00 
Payments & Adjustments 
01/10/05 IHC SELECT MED PAYMENT 1 5 5 5 . 6 0 -
01/10/05 CONTRACTUAL ADJUSTMENT 2 0 1 7 . 5 6 -
TOTALPAYMENTS 3 5 7 3 . 1 6 -
AMOUNT NOW DUE 172.84 
* See Explanation of Benefits (EOB) from your insurer 
OICE NUMBER: 21588014 
)VIDER: HOLMSTROM 
rqes 
03/05 POSTOP FOLLOW UP VISIT 
03/05 X-RAY: SHOULDER 
TOTAL CHARGES 
0 . 0 0 
6 3 . 0 0 
6 3 . 0 0 
Payments & Adjustments 
01/12/05 CONTRACTUAL ADJUSTMENT 
01/1 2/05 IHC SELECT MED PAYMENT 
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
2 3 . 3 1 -
0 . 0 0 -
2 3 . 3 1 -
AMOUNT NOW DUE 39 .69 
* See Explanation of Benefits (EOB) from your insurer 
PAST FINANCE CHARGES DUE 0.00 
* Finance Charges accrue at 18% annually on self-pay balances 
THIS STATEMENT DOES NOT REFLECT SERVICES THAT ARE PENDING A RESPONSE FROM YOUR INSURANCE. 
balance is past due. Please pay in full or call immediately to make payment arrangements. Financial 
stance is available for those in need 
JRRENT 
0 .00 
e contact CM 
30 DAYS 
212.53 
ur billing office at (E 
60 DAYS 
0.00 
*01) 408-8755 witl 
90 DAYS 
0.00 
i any billing auestic 
120 DAYS 
0.00 




PAY THIS AMOUNT 
215 .72 
Visit our web site in ILl 
•^Bl ALTA VIEW HOSPIIAL 
9660 SOUTH 1300 EAST 
w i u 4^ SANDY UT 84094 
I H L 116-60752672 
A SERVICE OF 1NTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE 
PLEASE SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
ON THE BACK OF THIS STATEMENT. 
j - Please check box if your address or insurance has 
•— changed, and provide your new information on the back. 
CARD NUMBEP 
SIGNATURE 
PAY ON OR BEFORE 
PAST DUE 




STATEMENT DATE: 3/07/05 
||Mlnl..l!I.M!.l,n,l,i,ll....!.!.i,ll.l.l.l..!.l.l«.ill<t! 
13Dai l t>00DbD7S2b72DDD002SbMbf l 
I ! n l , . l . . l n , l l . l „ l . . . l l ! l M . i l , . I I I , . . l l , . . ! l , M l ! . M l n l . 
ALTA VIEW HOSPITAL 
REMITTANCE PROCESSING 
PO BOX 410400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84141-0400 
1GTQOP699:1.1 3780-HCSPMGTONTJP.tJOOl125 
To ensure proper credit, detach and return above portion m the enclosed envelope. Please be sure the above return address is visible through v> mdou 7 q 5 ' ' -*M '°-' ' a 
PATIENTS NAME 







SERVICES RECEIVED / DATES OF SERVICE FOR QUESTIONS REGARDING YOUR ACCOUNT, PLEASE CALL 
iMBULATORY SURGERY 
RECEIVED: 12/28/04 THROUGH 
JOANNE (801) 269-2563 
OUT OF AREA TOLL FREE: 1-888-301-3881 EXT. 2563 
ACTIVITY SINCE LAST STATEMENT 
DATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
PREVIOUS BALANCE 2 5 6 . 4 6 
CURRENT BALANCE 256.46 
If you need financial assistance or to make payment arrangements, 
contact the Patient Account Representative listed above. 
Your account Is now being processed for placement with our 
collection division. 
IN ORDER TO PROTECT YOUR CREDIT, please pay the CURRENT BALANCE 
shown within 10 days, or your account will be assigned to them 
for immediate collection action. THIS IS THE FINAL STA TEMENT 
YOU WILL RECEIVE FROM US. 
i * * Payments received after the 'Statement Date' are not shown. 
INSURANCE 
PRIMARY: IHC SELECTMED 
DATE BILLED: 1 /04/05 
POLICY NUMBER: XXXXX4080 





ALTA VIEW HOSPITAL 
9660 SOUTH 1300 EAST 
Visit our web site at 
WWW.IHC.COM 
A delayed payment fee of 1.5% per month (anm 
percentage rate is 18%} may be charged on the 
current balance due. 
A T C M C M T 
/OS 
Plea Form 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 





STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No, . 0MfrflSZ<( 
i, i w L ^ wX, _, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision^) 
A. - nL-L-?n. a 
B. fly,, AlfrvUt 





^ o Minimum Mandatory 
r 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: , 
i\ o ^ a55&^\\ i3 c k i W *^.li~£~l'l- QsU raur*3 ?Qr\**s L*ti[i C L * * * ^ * * * ^ 
4 ^^TKT L IrVUM ft 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest): 
2 
_£& •4*k«Lg^ *vW ^**^ {* M***^ * t ^ f ) 
^u 4>M^ 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I (l^ Sve i^ot) (have) waived my right to counsel If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is ^ *W*\ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and jhe consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
jury trial, (a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
iq 
me and (b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses* I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination* I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal* I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above* 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties* I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
4 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty (Or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: /,
 / . i I il i 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
5 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am ^ zL years of age. I have attended school through the J grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was notunder the influence ofany drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drag, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free ofany mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced 
and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I 
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any 
reason. 
Dated this t ( day of 
I certify that I am the attorney for 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
£/ , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. ^S^T) 
6 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against. 
_, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)4s7^re entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public kite? 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Bar No. Q[\{% 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this \ V day of fi^UP ^ 2 &b> 
7 
Plea Colloquy 
1 SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2005 
2 HONORABLE ROYAL I. HANSEN, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 For the Plaintiff: CHRISTOPHER B. BOWN 
4 For the Defendant: STEPHEN W. HOWARD 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: This is the matter of State vs. Joshua 
7 Hale. It's an 04 case ending in 524. The record should 
8 reflect Mr. Hale's present [inaudible]. Appearances of 
9 counsel? 
10 MR. HOWARD: Stephen Howard for Mr. Hale. 
11 MR. BOWN: Chris Bown for the State. 
12 THE COURT: Status of this, Mr. Howard? 
13 MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, we've have a close 
14 resolution which involves reducing count one into a single 
15 burglary, a second degree felony. Also the addition of a 
16 count 10, a second degree felony, aggravated assault with the 
17 understanding the State would be moving to dismiss the 
18 remaining charges counts two through nine. 
19 THE COURT: Tell me what how you propose, Mr. Bown, 
20 to amend the information? 
21 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, we're going to - I'm going 
22 to give an amended information to the court after the fact. 
23 I think that's the best way to handle this. I believe - Mr. 
24 Howard looked up the statutes, but we'll just keep change on 

























portion basically and the section is actually 76-6-202, and 
that makes it a second degree felony. 
MR. HOWARD: The other change that would be 
involved would be the intent to commit theft as opposed to 
assault, and then striking the caused bodily injury language. 
THE COURT: For the aggravated burglary? 
MR. HOWARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Tell me the other change that I need to 
make. 
MR. HOWARD: The aggravated language is stricken, 
burglary a second degree felony, the statute number changes 
to 76-6-202. 
THE COURT: I have those. 
MR. HOWARD: The other changes is on the very last 
line, intent to commit theft rather than assault, and then 
the remaining language and caused bodily injury is stricken. 
THE COURT: And then we're adding an aggravated 
assault, a second degree? 
MR. BOWN: Yes, that'll be count 10 on the new 
information - the amended information. 
THE COURT: And I'll expect that from you, but I 
will take the plea on this. 
MR. BOWN: And I'll be sure to give that to the 
court and that language is basically count 10, aggravated 
25 assault, a second degree felony, at the same address, same 
1 date, in violation of Title 76 Chapter 5. 
2 MR. HOWARD: Section 103. 
3 MR. BOWN: Section 103. And as amended in that the 
4 defendant, as a party to the offense while committing the 
5 assault intended to cause serious bodily injury. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, and I'll expect the amended 
7 information on that. 
8 MR. BOWN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Let's see. 
10 Mr. Hale, you are - no objection, Mr. Howard, to 
11 the amended information; is that correct? 
12 MR. HOWARD: No objection. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Hale, you're not under the 
14 influence of drugs or alcohol are you? 
15 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Not taking any kind of prescription 
17 medication? 
18 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
19 THE COURT: No physical or mental disability? You 
20 read and understand the English language? 
21 MR. HALE: Yes, I do. 
22 THE COURT: And you've reviewed your statement of 
23 constitutional rights that you're giving up by way of 
24 entering this plea with your attorney? 
25 MR. HALE: Yes, I am. 
1 THE COURT: You understand those rights? 
2 MR. HALE: Yes, I do. 
3 THE COURT: Do you need any more time to speak with 
4 Mr. Howard concerning them? 
5 MR. HALE: No, 1 don't. 
6 THE COURT: You're satisfied with the 
7 representation Mr. Howard in this matter? 
8 MR. HALE: Definitely. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Howard, you've reviewed the 
10 statement of constitutional rights that Mr. Hale's giving up 
11 by way of entering this plea with him? 
12 MR. HOWARD: I have. 
13 THE COURT: And you believe he understands those 
14 rights? 
15 MR. HOWARD: I do. 
16 THE COURT: Any reason that he should not enter a 
17 plea today? 
18 MR. HOWARD: Nothing that I'm aware of. 
19 THE COURT: Would you state the factual basis for 
20 the charges? 
21 MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, in this case, Mr. Hale 
22 entered a motor home which technically under the case law 
23 qualifies as a dwelling with intent to commit a theft, and 
24 upon leaving the motor home was confronted by the owner. An 
25 altercation ensued during which the owner suffered a torn 
1 rotator cuff and a broken elbow. 
2 THE COURT: And is that in fact what happened, Mr. 
3 Hale? 
4 MR. HALE: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: You realize that by entering these 
6 I pleas you're admitting to that conduct? 
7 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
8 THE COURT: You understand as Mr. Howard has talked 
9 to you you have a right to go to trial, call your own 
10 witnesses, confront the witnesses that are called against 
11 you? 
12 MR. HALE: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: If you go to trial, Mr. Hale, you're 
14 presumed innocent. You do not have to testify against 
15 yourself to prove your innocence, the burden's upon the State 
16 to prove those charges beyond a reasonable doubt. You have a 
17 right to a speedy trial, to an attorney throughout the 
18 proceedings, to a jury trial. The jury must be composed of a 
19 panel of impartial jurors, it must be unanimous verdict for 
20 you to be convicted, Mr. Hale. You have a right to appeal a 
21 conviction whereas your right to appeal a guilty plea is much 
22 more limited. Do you understand those rights? 
23 MR. HALE: Yes, sir, I do. 
24 THE COURT: Any questions you have? 
25 MR. HALE: No, not at this time. 
1 THE COURT: These are both second degree felonies. 
2 Second degree felonies carry a commitment of one to 15 years 
3 at the Utah State Prison. Do you understand that? 
4 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: They can run consecutively, meaning one 
6 on top of the other, so it could be up to 30 years at the 
7 state prison. Do you understand that? 
8 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: The fine in each case is up to $18,500, 
10 so the fine could be a total of $37,000 under these 
11 circumstances. Do you understand that as well? 
12 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Any threats, coercion or force used to 
14 have you enter these pleas? 
15 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Any promises made to you? 
17 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
18 THE COURT: You're doing this as your own free 
19 will? 
2 0 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: You also understand that the court's 
22 the only one that's going to sentence you in this matter. 
23 You will probably receive a pre-sentence report with 
24 recommendations, but those aren't binding upon the Court. 
25 The Court is the one that's going to make the final 
1 determination. Do you understand that as well, Mr. Hale? 
2 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
3 THE COURT: Let's see, Mr. Hale, how do you - I'd 
4 invite you to sign the affidavit. The Court's received the 
5 affidavit signed by Mr. Hale in open court. The Court 
6 incorporates it to the record and relies upon it. 
7 Mr. Hale, how do you plead to amended count one, 
8 burglary, a second degree felony? 
9 MR. HALE: Guilty. 
10 THE COURT: And how do you plead to amended count 
11 10, which is going to appear on the new information? 
12 MR. HALE: Guilty. 
13 THE COURT: The amended count 10 is aggravated 
14 assault, a second degree felony. How do you plead to that? 
15 MR. HALE: Guilty. 
16 THE COURT: The Court accepts those guilty pleas, 
17 finds them to be knowing, intelligent and voluntarily 
18 entered. You have a right to file a motion to withdraw those 
19 pleas up until the time you're sentenced. You have a right 
20 to be sentenced not less than two or more than 45 days from 
21 today's date. The State's motion to dismiss counts two 
22 through nine; is that correct? 
23 MR. BOWN: It is, Your Honor, with the 
24 understanding that restitution would be imposed on those, 
25 although I doubt that because all items were recovered. But 
8 
1 that stack caveat. 
2 THE COURT: And Mr. Halek, that State -I'm going 
3 to grant that motion to dismiss those pursuant to the State's 
4 motion and counsel's negotiation with the understanding that 
5 you're still responsible for restitution if in fact there is 
6 restitution. Do you understand that? 
7 MR. HALE: I do, sir. 
8 THE COURT: Now I assume we're looking at a pre-
9 sentence reprot; is that correct? 
10 MR. HOWARD: We are. Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: You have a hold that's currently 
12 keeping you at the prison; is that correct? 
13 MR. HOWARD: I believe so, yes. 
14 THE COURT: And do you have a date on that, Mr. 
15 Hale? 
16 MR. HALE: I do not. 
17 THE COURT: I'm going to have AP&P see you at the 
18 prison and prepare a pre-sentence report making the 
19 recommendation. You waive the time for sentencing, counsel? 
20 MR. HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: And our date for sentencing was when? 
22 COURT CLERK: I don't know how long it's going to 
23 take AP&P to get out there, so I would formally set it on the 
24 28th of March but that's not six weeks [inaudible]. 
25 THE COURT: I think we've got a hold and so I think 
1 we've got time. 
2 MR. BOWN: I should point out, this came up and 
3 they actually have AP&P agents that go out to the prison to 
4 do these things, so we usually set out for the regular 45 
5 days that they usually request 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 I MR. BOWN: So I believe that March date would be 
appropriate. 
9 I COURT CLERK: Okay, we'll set it for March 28th at 
10 8:30. 
11 I THE COURT: We will plan on seeing you at that 
12 1 time, Mr. Hale, on the 28th 













Trial Court Rulings 
Hearing on Motion to Continue 
1 SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; MONDAY, APRIL 11, 2005 
2 HONORABLE ROYAL I. HANSEN, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 For the Plaintiff: CHRISTOPHER B. BOWN 
4 For the Defendant: MANNY C. GARCIA 
5 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
6 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
7 P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 THE COURT: This is the matter of State vs. Joshua 
9 Hale. It's an 04 case ending in 524. The record should 
10 reflect Mr. Hale's present with counsel, Mr. Garcia. 
11 Appearing for the State? 
12 MR. BOWN: Chris Bown for the State. 
13 THE COURT: The status of this matter? 
14 MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, this matter is set for 
15 sentencing at this point. However, Mr. Hale, pro se, after 
16 relieving his first lawyer of his duties, filed a motion to 
17 withdraw his plea and I believe he's filing bar complaints 
18 and other things. I was given this case for the sentencing 
19 and to review it and to give Mr. Hale my opinion of the plea, 
20 whether or not it was a proper plea, whether or not there's a 
21 factual basis for it and all of that. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. GARCIA: I reviewed the entire thing including 
24 the change of plea colloquy. I talked to some other lawyers 
25 about this because I wanted to be perfectly clear. And in my 
11 
1 opinion Joshua's complaints have no merit, however, he does 
2 not accept that, therefore I cannot help him and so I'm 
3 moving to withdraw. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Let's see, Mr. Hale. 
5 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: I notice that you have filed a motion 
7 to withdraw your plea here. 
8 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: And I think that it's helpful to have 
10 counsel in doing so, and you're certainly entitled to raise 
11 those issues and bring those before the Court. Mr. Garcia's 
12 here and been appointed to assist you to do so. What's your 
13 situation currently? Do you seek the assistance of counsel 
14 in proceeding with this? 
15 MR. HALE: I do. Under State vs. Hawk I'd like to 
16 move to get a non-contract conflict attorney. On the grounds 
17 that he stated we always had a conflict. 
18 MR. GARCIA: Judge, I don't know how that's going 
19 to happen. 
20 THE COURT: I'm concerned that you're down - Mr. 
21 Garcia's stepped in and I don't know that we're going to have 
22 additional counsel, Mr. Hale, that's going to be available 
23 under those circumstances. I don't know that the counsel-I 
24 think the disagreement that you had probably is a 
25 disagreement with the conclusions of counsel, not that you're 
12 
1 unable to communicate with the counsel or work with him. Is 
2 that correct? 
3 MR. HALE: A mixture actually. There's - we didn't 
4 communicate very much just now back there, so I wouldn't say-
5 MR. GARCIA: Judge, he sent me everything. He sent 
6 me everything he had, copies of the motions, a letter that he 
7 wrote to the prosecutor, the letter that he wrote to John 
8 Hill. I reviewed the facts in the case, the police reports, 
9 I reviewed again the colloquy at the change of plea, and 
10 those are my conclusions and again while I certainly want to 
11 help Joshua, I cannot go against what I found out and 
12 represent him diligently. And so I really don't know what 
13 else do to. He's adamant. 
14 MR. HALE: I wouldn't say that. I have a basis for 
15 this. The plea was not factually based. An aggravated 
16 assault -
17 MR. GARCIA: That's not what you plead to, Josh. 
18 MR. HALE: My plea does have a first - a second 
19 degree 1-5 aggravated assault. Upon asking Stephen Howard if 
20 there's a third degree, he denied that. He said there's no 
21 such thing as a third degree felony aggravated assault. Now 
22 as soon as I saw the - that's why - that's why I immediately 
23 wanted to [inaudible] out my plea. As soon as I saw that I 
24 went wow. I even asked him - the plea bargain's supposed to 
25 be in my favor. That's why it's called a plea bargain. It's 
13 
1 I supposed to go towards the defendant not the State. It's 
2 I supposed to lean towards me. In no way shape or form did it 
3 do that. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Let's see, any input from the 
5 State? 
6 I MR. BOWN: Your Honor, Mr. Hale's not entitled to 
7 chose his counsel and ask for outside, for the state to pay 
8 for him to get another attorney. We have that set up through 
9 the LDA and they're conflict attorneys. If he's unsatisfied 
10 with their representation, he has to go out and hire himself 
11 - hire an attorney himself and I think the law's pretty clear 
12 that the State does have to provide an attorney to Mr. Hale, 
13 he's indigent, but we don't have to abide by his wishes. So 
14 in that regard, he should be aware that he either has to 
15 accept what the Court appoints or he needs to go hire an 
16 attorney on his own. 
17 The other aspect the factual basis, you know, I can 
18 tell him that the law's pretty clear that a motor home counts 
19 as a dwelling under the law. We've researched that. That's 
20 in his letters to us, you know, that's the problem that the 
21 law's pretty clear that a motor home counts as a dwelling. 
22 Also in trying to get a third degree felony aggravated 
23 assault, I mean, the factual basis isn't there because you 
24 need a charge and there's no factual basis for him getting a 
25 weapon charge. He did get a fairly substantial good plea 
14 
1 agreement. It's two second degree felonies out of one first 
2 and about eight or nine other charges of varying degrees of 
3 felonies. I understand his position, but it's just there's 
4 no basis in the law and we'll just wait for him to either 
5 represent himself, hire another attorney or accept the advice 
6 of counsel that Your Honor assigns him. 
7 THE COURT: Let's see. Mr. Hale, I think that's an 
8 accurate statement of the law, but that doesn't necessarily 
9 mean the results are binding on you just as far as counsel 
10 goes. You - if you wish to retain your own counsel, I'm 
11 going to give you a chance to do that. Otherwise, I'm going 
12 to give you the opportunity to utilize the services of 
13 appointed counsel. That's really up to you, Mr. Hale, as to 
14 what you'd like to do, but I want to give you every 
15 opportunity to represent your issues to the court. The 
16 court's going to look at those, hear both sides of the matter 
17 and make a decision based on it. So it's really up to you as 
18 to what you'd like to do under those circumstances. 
19 MR. HALE: Well, I'm [inaudible] I don't have funds 
20 to get an attorney, so that's -
21 THE COURT: You don't have assets - do you have 
22 family or anybody else that could assist you? 
23 MR. HALE: No. Not that can afford to do something 
24 like that, so it's out of the question. I don't know how I 
25 can make that happen. 
15 
1 THE COURT: I would - I realize that you have a 
2 disagreement with Mr. Garcia currently, but I think that it's 
3 certainly in your interest to have the assistance of counsel. 
4 I would like to give you the opportunity to talk to Mr. 
5 Garcia and see - discuss alternatives. It sounds like you 
6 have done so to date, but with the understanding that this is 
7 your option right here that the court's providing you. I 
8 think it's to your benefit to have counsel one way or 
9 another. 
10 MR. HALE: I definitely want counsel, but Mr. 
11 Garcia's - he'd state he doesn't want to represent me. 
12 MR. GARCIA: I didn't say that, Your Honor. 
13 MR. HALE: The bottom line is he has to agree with 
14 my cause and argue the law in the facts in light of as much 
15 as he can. And that's not happening and that's denying me my 
16 constitutional right. I deserve a proper defense. This 
17 man's not going to give me it. 
18 THE COURT: I think what he's going to be able to 
19 do for you is take an independent review of that. If he's 
20 simply agreeing with you then he's not providing you some 
21 kind of an independent review. What he needs to do is simply 
22 look at the pleadings, the facts, review the file in the 
23 matter and then give you his independent analysis of it. It 
24 may or may not agree with your position that you have 
25 proffered. That's why you have an attorney, and he's going 
16 
1 to be familiar with those that the law and the issues in this 
2 area, and so I want you to take advantage of that, and I 
3 don't want you to necessarily tell me about issues or 
4 problems that you have here, but I'd like you to at least sit 
5 down with Mr. Garcia, look at that, see if there is some way 
6 you can utilize his services, and if in fact that that's the 
7 appointment of counsel and that's really what you're entitled 
8 to under the circumstances, 
9 MR. GARCIA: Judge, I believe we've done that. 
10 Again, today isn't the first time we've communicated. We've 
11 communicated through letters before. But again, I reviewed 
12 the file, I spoke with colleagues that are well versed in 
13 criminal law, and I just had more grounds to tell Jason that 
14 - or Joshua that he had, excuse me, Josh that he had a 
15 meritorious issue. I can argue his position, but I don't 
16 think that that is what I should do because again I don't 
17 think that there is a basis for it. But that's just my 
18 analysis of it. 
19 MR. HALE: The bottom line is the prosecutor has -
20 he has to prove every element that's stated in the book or 
21 code. 
22 THE COURT: And Mr. Garcia is certainly aware of 
23 those and he's the one that can give you some help with 
24 regard to elements. I think, Mr. Hale, that if in fact 
25 you're concerned about the elements issue. 
17 
1 Mr. Garcia, I'm going to ask that you speak with 
2 him on those specific issues. I'm going to set this up for 
3 another hearing after you've had a chance to talk about those 
4 specific concerns that you had, Mr. Hale, and then let's see 
5 if we can - if there's some kind of resolution or position 
6 that we can 
7 present. Any other options you're aware of? 
8 MR. GARCIA: Judge, again without going into 
9 attorney/client because it really -
10 THE COURT: I don't want you to do that. 
11 MR. GARCIA: And I'm not going to do that. But 
12 basically, Mr. Hale is - has his own interpretation of the 
13 burglary statute, and some language in there about a place 
14 that is usually used as a dwelling. In other words, his 
15 position is that this motor home is a vehicle burglary not a 
16 dwelling - not a burglary of a dwelling. And he also says 
17 that a broken elbow and a torn rotator cuff is not serious 
18 bodily injury, that it's substantial injury but it is just 
19 tantamount to a simple assault. Those are his positions. I 
20 just don't agree with him. 
21 THE COURT: I understand. 
22 Mr. Hale, I want you to hear Mr. Garcia. 
23 I'm not going to release you from this case today, 
24 but I'd like you to speak once more with Mr. Hale. 



























THE COURT: Explain your position on that and then, 
Mr. Hale, I'd invite you back, if in fact your wish is to 
retain your own counsel and I'm going to give you every 
opportunity to do that. If not, I want you to utilize fully 
the resources that have been provided to you with regard to 
the court-appointed counsel, and I'm going to give you one 
more chance to do that. I'm going to set this back up for a 
hearing and if, in fact, you're able to resolve those 
differences, let's see what we can do to go forward at that 
time. 
What kind of date do you have? 
COURT CLERK: We have May 2nd and the 9th. 
MR. GARCIA: What days are those? 
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Let's do May 9th and what 
Mr. Garcia? 









COURT CLERK: 8:30. Does 8:30 work? 
MR. GARCIA: That's fine. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Hale, you need to understand 
that that's the opportunity you have. Utilize these 
resources, see what you can do and if you can articulate that 
issue and Mr. Garcia's going to listen to that openly and 
fully and see what we can do to resolve the matter. Okay? 
Good luck to you. We'll see you on the 9th. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; MONDAY, MAY 16, 2005 
HONORABLE ROYAL I. HANSEN, JUDGE PRESIDING 
For the Plaintiff: CHRISTOPHER B. BOWN 
For the Defendant: MANNY C. GARCIA 
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, Mr. Hale is present. I've 
made two motions to withdraw in this 
THE 
too and we'11 
> case. 
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GARCIA: Yes. 
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COURT: And for the state? 
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1 my understanding that you and Mr. Garcia have had some 
2 differences in how the case should be defended under these 
3 circumstances. Would that be accurate? 
4 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: Is that accurate as well, Mr. Garcia? 
6 MR. GARCIA: Yes, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: I'm not going to dismiss him as 
8 counsel, but I am willing to hear from you, Mr. Hale, with 
9 regard to your motion and -
10 MR. HALE: Yeah, I don't want Mr. Garcia to be 
11 involved in the case at all. That's one thing I won't have. 
12 THE COURT: And I want him to be available to 
13 consult if in fact you wish to do so. 
14 MR. HALE: Okay, but he won't be making statements 
15 in my defense, right? 
16 MR. GARCIA: Correct. 
17 THE COURT: And however you would like to 
18 coordinate with him, I'm prepared to do so and he's available 
19 to assist and help in any way you deem appropriate. But I'm 
20 prepared to hear you, Mr. Hale, with regard to this issue. 
21 Let's see if we can't get it resolved. 
22 MR. GARCIA: May I have a seat? 
23 THE COURT: You may. 
24 MR. HALE: Could I get a free hand to be able to 
25 look at my notes and things like that? 
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1 THE COURT: You may. 
2 MR. HALE: First of all, sir, I'd like to just let 
3 the Court know that AP&P did, [inaudible] did try and contact 
4 me and finish the pre-sentence report. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. HALE: So they aren't in any fault. I just let 
7 them know that I wasn't willing to make a statement at this 
8 time in the case so -
9 THE COURT: And I think I saw a note to that effect 
10 and I think the note indicated that you were interested in 
11 withdrawing your pleas that you had entered; is that 
12 accurate? 
13 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
14 MR. BOWN: And, Your Honor, there was a pre-
15 sentence report prepared. I don't know if you received it but 
16 I have. 
17 THE COURT: I do not have that. I just got the 
18 statement that indicates that we're waiting for a statement 
19 from counsel. And AP&P has a copy of that? 
20 You've seen this report, Mr. Hale? 
21 MR. HALE: Yes, I just actually - I didn't read the 
22 whole thing, but I had a chance to glance through it. There 
23 is some inconsistencies that I want to address when that time 
24 comes. 
25 THE COURT: And Mr. Garcia, you've seen a copy of 
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1 the pre-sentence report? 
2 MR. GARCIA: I did. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay; let me hear from you, 
4 J Mr. Hale, with regard to your motion. 
MR. HALE: Well, I'm addressing ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and I believe I've had ineffective 
7 I assistance on both matters of counsel from Mr. Howard and Mr. 
8 Garcia. 
9 I To start with Mr. Howard, in our initial interview 
10 I on January 4th at the prison, I laid out all of the facts of 
11 my side of the story to him. We talked and he seemed to have 
12 an understanding of what happened and he was willing to 
13 approach avenues of defense for me. 1 raised questions about 
14 the information, about what's wrong, the inconsistencies in 
15 it as far as the theft being charge that I took the 
16 [inaudible] from the defendant - or from the victim. Nothing 
17 was ever taken from Mr. Ford. That's an issue and I raised 
18 that with him and I also raised the degrees of the thefts 
19 being six class A's and a third degree felony. The property 
20 that they have in their custody wouldn't represent those, for 
21 one the amounts $300 to $1,000 at six items worth that much. 
22 There's nothing in their custody that even warrants that let 
23 alone the third which was a $1,000 to $5,000. I mean, that's 
24 a huge amount of money. There's no item worth that but yet 
25 they're coming at me with a third degree felony. Very 
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questionable. I brought that up and he said he would address 
it. 
I also brought up information, the language that I 
forced Mr. Ford to the ground and repeatedly punched and 
kicked him. Now at the time, you know, I knew I had done 
something wrong and I am a person who will take 
responsibility for what I've done. I felt that that isn't 
right, I need to get that information corrected. I let Mr. 
Howard know and he said, yeah, and he'll look into that. Now 
on the January 10th hearing he let me know that, well, I 
looked into those and those inconsistences, don't worry, 
they're not a big deal, they aren't going to effect the case. 
I talked to the prosecutor and he said he's willing to amend 
those, but it would take time and really they're not an 
issue, Mr. Hale, don't worry about it. So I took his advice 
as gold. Yet that allowed the State to build - to paint a 
picture, an evidentiary picture that is incorrect that is 
tainted and further allowed them to make me look so guilty 
it's unbelievable. 
Now at the time I didn't know. I don't have an 
actual knowledge of the law at that time. I've investigated 
things and I've learned a lot. But at the time, you know, 
all I've ever done is go to court, accept the plea and do my 
time. So I don't really have a knowledge of how the process 
goes of a defense and what you're supposed to do as far 
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1 quashing the information. I mean, he never - he never took 
2 an defensive stance on it. After the first - at the first 
3 interview, he took an offensive stance. He was willing to 
4 address avenues of defense for me. He believed that this RV 
5 couldn't constitute a burglary, that he didn't think that it 
6 was a dwelling, but yet at the January 10th hearing all the 
7 talk was about was a plea bargain. I don't understand what 
8 changed, you know. 
9 Like I said, I express my opinions I've done 
10 something wrong, I know I need to be punished for it. 
11 Mr. Howard had my side of the story. He knew my 
12 intent. He knew what I was up to that night the crime 
13 occurred. He knew and he should have addressed the defense 
14 options available giving my testimony because it is the other 
15 side of the story and it changes the picture completely. It 
16 changes the State's case completely. It changes the way the 
17 injuries occurred. There's definite questions of law there. 
18 He never addressed the fact that I was extremely 
19 intoxicated which I was and that's under 76-2-306 voluntary 
20 intoxication, that should have been an avenue for defense 
21 alone right there, but that was never even presented or even 
22 thought about or even let me know that that exists. It took 
23 me going to prison and being in the population and going to 
24 the library and finding the book and being able to look 
25 through the statutes and that's why I found that and that 
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1 applies to me. Again it was never even mentioned to me. 
2 It's unbelievable. 
3 I'd like to quote out of State vs. Hollands. As 
4 far as making - admitting your guilt, "We cast no aspirations 
5 J on the proposition that confession is good for the soul from 
a religious standpoint. However, while defense counsel be 
not discouraged, a guilty plea in appropriate cases, defense 
counsel must be weary less the defendant out of a moral sense 
9 I of guilt for having committed a crime, plead guilty to a 
10 degree of crime that is not appropriate with respects to the 
11 acts committed." Being he had my side of the story, it's 
12 amazing that he allowed me to enter these charges and he 
13 knows not only was that not my intent, but it's even 
14 questionable if that's what happened. 
15 Like I said, on the 10th of January we never 
16 discussed anything as far as more avenues for defense. It 
17 went straight from that January 4th interview to, well, I've 
18 talked to the prosecutor, he's willing to make a deal. I 
19 didn't know if I was at the time willing to make a deal, but 
20 he's throwing all these options at me for this. I asked him 
21 immediately at the time I was trying to think of what I'm 
22 going to do and I asked him, well, is there any way you can 
23 form a less intrusive assault charge instead of a second 
24 degree aggravated charge. And he stated, well, I'll try 
25 that. That's a legal impossibility. The court doesn't have 
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1 jurisdiction to construct a statute. There's three statutes 
2 apply that are all assaults and you can't change the language 
3 of them to conform with me. For him to even let me believe 
4 that possibility, he should have never allowed that to 
5 happen. 
6 Furthermore, once he did come back I ask him well, 
7 is there any way you can get me a third degree aggravated 
8 assault. He actually said to me back in the holding cell 
9 that does not exist, Mr. Hale. And I thought about it and 
10 went well, so I had an option [inaudible] . So I thought 
11 about it a little bit more. I decided well, I'm going to ask 
12 him a few more questions here as far as the RV goes and how 
13 it can be a building and in every hearing I wanted to express 
14 that I asked him all these questions as far as well, how does 
15 it fit under a dwelling, how could it be considered a 
16 building, isn't it a vehicle, it has tires. I asked him all 
17 these questions, I mean, I have a 12th grade education, I'm 
18 not an extremely smart person, but I can - it's a vehicle. 
19 There's no doubt about that and the language of the burglary 
20 statute that I had as far as the assault it didn't even 
21 mention - ever mention that a vehicle could be probable. So 
22 I'm using the information I was given in court which was the 
23 aggravated assault [inaudible] and it was very, that's vague 
24 and that's all I had for information at the time. 
25 But me being asking all these questions of Mr. 
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1 Howard should have rendered a reason for him to investigate 
2 and furthermore show me that, yes, Mr. Hale, here's a vehicle 
3 burglary statute that applies to you, here's a third degree 
4 aggravated assault that does apply to you, yes, it drops 
5 intent and it applies to you. He should have addressed these 
6 and showed me all defenses that are provable for me. These 
7 questions rendered that. 
8 Yeah, he's not entitled to do that just out of the 
9 blue, but being that I asked these questions it became a 
10 reason to and he should have addressed it. He didn't. 
11 I'd like to quote another - yet out of State vs. 
12 Hollands. "Defense counsel's obligation is to explain the 
13 evidence against the defendant, the nature of all defenses 
14 that might be provable", hence, the third degree aggravated 
15 assault which is provable, the vehicle burglary which is a 
16 class A which could be provable. It definitely applies, it's 
17 a vehicle. And a misdemeanor assault which also applies. 
18 All the various options the defendant has of pleading guilty 
19 or not guilty and going to trial and possibility or likely 
20 consequences of those options. Should the defendant chose to 
21 contest the charges against him or her, it's defense 
22 counsel's obligation to require the State to prove its case 
23 beyond a reasonable doubt. I'm presenting these questions 
24 that would make it so the State's case isn't quite - it 
25 doesn't reach that burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. I'm 
29 
1 sorry, there's just no way. 
2 Furthermore, like I said not only did he fail to 
3 discuss the third degree aggravated assault, he actually said 
4 it did not exist, and that was in the plea negotiations. And 
5 that was like I said that was one of my stipulations to 
6 accepting the plea is well, let me have a third degree 
7 aggravated assault and I'll probably take this and not waste 
8 the court's time. I know I've done something wrong and I 
9 might deserve this degree, yes. I was willing to take the 
10 | punishment. I'm not the type of person that sidesteps that. 
11 You've done something wrong, I will take it. That was on the 
12 February 14th. At last on that day I felt there wasn't 
13 something right. I didn't know what it was that was wrong 
14 about the whole situation, but I just knew there wasn't 
15 something right. I felt I should ask one more time in maybe 
16 a more forward way about the aggravated burglary charge and I 
17 addressed - by my interpretation of the aggravated burglary 
18 in the information there's no way I could possibly be found 
19 guilty of that charge with a jury, they wouldn't do it. I'm 
20 not guilty according to that language. Mr. Howard agreed. 
21 He said, yes, I agree. I totally agree with that. But he 
22 sidestepped it by stating this. If we go to a preliminary 
23 hearing the prosecutor isn't going to try to change that. 
24 He'll actually drop that and come back at you with the two 1 
25 to 15Ts anyway. But furthermore, he's going to come back at 
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1 you with all those thefts too, the six class A's and that one 
2 third degree. So it's in your best interest to take these 
3 two 1 to 15fs. But that right there, that's maybe not be 
4 blackmail, but it's pretty - they're trying to scare me into 
5 taking this. 
6 Immediately I thought more, okay, what am I going 
7 to do. I had no way to investigate these in the court let 
8 alone out in the prison, I was in R&O and had no resources 
9 whatsoever to be able to even investigate what he's telling 
10 me. 
11 I think it's pretty much understood when your 
12 defense counsel tells you something you believe it. I 
13 believed it. I believed every word he told me. I believed 
14 he - I believed the fact he told me there is no third degree. 
15 I took that as fact and decided, well, this is what I deserve 
16 then and I took the plea. 
17 Upon entering Gunnison I was able to get a hold of 
18 Utah State Code and look through it and investigate the 
19 charges I plead to, also the aggravated assault. Also I was 
20 able to investigate a lot of other things and it became 
21 extremely apparent what happened. To me I could believe it. 
22 That's why I immediately withdrew my plea and put in the 
23 motions that I did. 
24 THE COURT: Anything else as far as issues that -
25 MR. HALE: With Mr. Howard, no, that - Mr. Garcia I 
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1 do have some with him. 
2 THE COURT: Tell me about anything, any other 
3 concerns that you have. 
4 MR. HALE: Well, as far as - as far as when we were 
5 in our last hearing we had - me and Mr. Garcia had our 
6 discussions, and, okay, he has a right to disagree, but to me 
7 I know that this vehicle is a vehicle. It's just simple 
8 matters of law we're dealing with here in statutory 
9 interpretation how the statute's read. And he acted like 
10 because I'm this convicted felon who am I to be able to - who 
11 am I to be able to interpret the statute. Who am I - I mean, 
12 come on. The legislative writes these with the intent that 
13 any person with reasonable knowledge can grab a dictionary, 
14 if needs be, and by the plain language the statute read it 
15 and understand it. But yet I'm an idiot for even trying 
16 this? The man is yelling at me, he's using language in the 
17 back there. I never once used a foul word, but yet my own 
18 lawyer is supposed to be professionalr using foul language 
19 and yelling at me. It's ridiculous for him to take the 
20 stance he did towards me was unbelievable. I can't believe 
21 it. 
22 Furthermore, when I stated I was grasping for 
23 straws in the courtroom, I didn't know what to do. I was 
24 looking, okay, they're painting more of a picture. My own 
25 lawyer's painting a picture that I am this arrogant - I know 
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1 nothing, I'm just stating these bold accusations. Well, I 
2 know one fact is for certain, the plea was involuntary or not 
3 I intelligently made because of one thing. The one stipulation 
I had was a third degree aggravated assault and I was told it 
didn't exist. That's not correct. It exists, it's there. I 
brought that up in court in front of you. I don't know if 
Your Honor remembers that or not, but I said, well, I 
wouldn't have plead to this had I known I wanted that 0-5 
9 I more than I wanted 15, that was my stipulation. I was 
10 deceived and told that it didn't exist, but yet it does 
11 exist. And I brought it up in court and said, well, Your 
12 Honor, as I remember, there's a third degree that applies and 
13 it drops the intent in that crime and it's a 0-5. And, of 
14 course, the State steps up and happens to say, well, actually 
15 that crime includes a weapon. It doesn't meet what I'm 
16 saying. Well, Mr. Garcia [inaudible] that's not true, that's 
17 a valid - that's a law I'm stating. And for the defense or 
18 the prosecution to state it doesn't exist, or that what I'm 
19 stating it applies to a weapon, it's unbelievable. It may 
20 not be a blatant lie, but it's definitely deception. It's 
21 deceiving the court. It's deceiving you and it's deceiving 
22 me. And by Mr. Garcia allowing that to take place, he tells 
23 me he's a 23 year experienced lawyer but yet he allowed that 
24 to go on the record that his attorney - or his client who is 
25 an uneducated convicted felon in the Utah State Prison has no 
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1 idea what he's talking about. Yet I stated a very simple 
2 matter of law and I was shut down by the State and then my 
3 supposed lawyer who's supposed to be defending me can't even 
4 argue a simple matter of law with me, can't even - he's so 
5 prejudiced against me that he cannot even argue a simple 
6 matter of law. 
7 When we went back and you asked us to discuss more, 
8 he had the nerve to ask me where are you getting this 
9 substantial bodily injury issue, where do you get this from? 
10 I said it's in the Utah Code. It is in the class A - it is 
11 in the assault statute under 75-102 assault, it's stated 
12 right in there. It's also furthermore - it's further defined 
13 under 76-1-601(10), it's in there, it is in the Code and 
14 he's questioning me if it's in there or not, where did you 
15 get this from? 
16 When I got back to Gunnison I was able to go look. 
17 I found a ^94 code book and I looked through it and sure 
18 enough, there was no such thing as substantial bodily injury 
19 in 1994, so it's obvious - completely obvious that Mr. Garcia 
20 is taking his knowledge of the law which should be - for one 
21 thing he's supposed to study up as I read it in the Rules of 
22 Professional Conduct, and keep his competence up and know the 
23 current laws as they read, but yet he's telling me the 
24 substantial bodily injury doesn't exist? It exists, it's 
25 there. That becomes obvious to me that Mr. Garcia's 
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1 knowledge of the law is outdated. He doesn't know what he's 
2 talking about, but he's telling me I'm an idiot. 
3 THE COURT: And I'm really interested in knowing 
4 why the plea was not knowing and voluntary and if there are 
5 other issues that go to that point let me hear those. I've 
6 I looked at your pleadings that you've filed and I have 
7 reviewed those and am aware of those as well. 
8 MR. HALE: Yeah, it comes down to at the time it 
9 could be knowingly and voluntarily, but I didn't have the 
10 information. I asked the correct questions to get that 
11 information, but yet I wasn't given it. Now the second I was 
12 able to get this information, there's no way. I did not have 
13 this knowledge. I did not know that there's a third degree 
14 aggravated assault. I didn't know there's a vehicle burglary 
15 that applies to me. There's so many - I did not know any of 
16 this. It's very -
17 THE COURT: And I have an appreciation of your 
18 argument and have provided you with an opportunity to present 
19 that to the court. 
20 Let's see, Mr. Garcia, anything else that the Court 
21 should know with regard to this issue and I guess I'm 
22 thinking of two issues and one is whether or not the plea is 
23 knowing and voluntary, whether or not there's anything you 
24 need to advise the Court, and secondly with regard to counsel 
25 anything that you think is important for the Court to be 
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1 aware of. 
2 MR. GARCIA: I'm not going to comment other than to 
3 say that if a defendant does not feel comfortable with his 
4 plea for just about any reason, I think the Court ought to 
5 let him withdraw it and let him head to trial. I think 
6 that's always the solution and that's what Mr. Hale's asking 
7 for here. So again whether it was knowing or voluntary, I 
8 listened to the colloquy, the tape of that and I know there 
9 was an affidavit signed, and he says that he received all 
10 this information afterwards, and feels he has a valid point. 
11 Again, any time a defendant does not feel comfortable with 
12 his plea for any reason, I think the Court ought to let him 
13 withdraw and let him to go trial. Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Garcia. 
15 Let's see, Mr. Bown, the State's position. 
16 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, I'll say it again. There's 
17 no third aggravated assault in this case because it doesn't 
18 meet the elements. You have to have a weapon to do a third 
19 degree felony. Second of all, that wasn't the offer and it 
20 wouldn't have changed regardless. 
21 The other thing I think Mr. Hale is the mistaken 
22 basis he's operating under is that a motor home is a vehicle. 
23 There's actually case law and I'll give him the correct case 
24 law on the record, it's State vs. Cox, it's 826 P.2d 656 and 
25 State vs. Cates, that is an uncited or an unpublished 
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1 opinion, but it's under 2000 Utah App. 256. Both of them 
2 address - and the Cates case specifically states that a 
3 camping trailer was a dwelling and it's not based on whether 
4 it's mobile or it's a vehicle. These cases make it clear and 
5 I think that's what Mr. Garcia was saying the day he was here 
6 in court and that's what Mr. Howard was probably trying to 
7 tell Mr. Hale is that under case law that has been 
8 interpreted to be a dwelling and Mr. Hale can't get around 
9 that fact. 
10 The only other issue, Your Honor, is Mr. Garcia's 
11 pointed out that he should just be allowed to withdraw his 
12 guilty plea. I think you have to look at the fact that 
13 there's a victim on the other side who has finally some 
14 closure when he plead guilty. Mr. Hale has failed to raise a 
15 valid concern to have his guilty plea withdrawn. He did sign 
16 the affidavit, he was here in court and plead guilty, and he 
17 has failed to show why it should be withdrawn. I think the 
18 ineffective assistance of counsel is better taken up on 
19 appeal if he wants to do that. But I don't think he's met 
20 the burden. He hasn't shown what he needs to do to show that 
21 his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Everything he's 
22 raised are issues that I think his attorneys dismissed 
23 because they weren't issues. So once again, I think Mr. 
24 Hale's operating on a misunderstanding of the law. He's 
25 trying to read the statutes and I applaud him for that, but 
37 
1 he just doesn't read them in the light in which the Utah 
2 Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals has interpreted those 
3 laws to make clear that when he plead to is feasible, he's 
4 met the elements and he admitted to that conduct. So I'll 
5 submit it on that, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 MR. HALE: May I have a word real quick? 
8 THE COURT: You may, Mr. Hale. 
9 MR. HALE: Under 76-5-103 aggravated assault, once 
10 again we're being deceived here. I'm going to read this and 
11 we'll see what you think, Your Honor. A person who commits 
12 aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
13 section 65-102 and he intentionally causes serious bodily 
14 injury to another or under circumstances not to a violation 
15 of 1A uses a dangerous weapon - which is what the 
16 prosecutor's talking about here as defined in 76-1-601 or 
17 other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
18 bodily injury. That is a third degree felony and that does 
19 apply. This is amazing that he even brought it up again. It 
20 is a class B misdemeanor to provide false or misleading 
21 evidence to a court. He is not only an officer of the court, 
22 but he has a duty to uphold as a prosecutor. He cannot do 
23 this. This is against the law is what this man is doing 
24 right now in the courtroom. He cannot deceive the court in 
25 J that way. I've read the law. I know it exists. He cannot 
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1 lie and say that this does not apply, or other means or force 
2 likely to produce serious bodily injury. It still 
3 encompasses the bodily injury but yet - and this is my 
4 grounds right there for being mislead by my counsel. That 
5 would prove of ineffective assistance because the fact that 
6 this does exist and I asked for it and it's plea 
7 negotiations. It's not he offers a plea bargain and that's 
8 the end of the story. No, it's negotiations. I'm allowed to 
9 be able to say, well, I want this and if not I take it to 
10 trial. That's what inherent in it. I'm allowed that right, 
11 but yet by being deceived it means, okay, well, I don't have 
12 an avenue here, so I did take the plea. 
13 THE COURT: Good. And I'm aware of your argument, 
14 Mr. Hale, and I appreciate the effort that you have 
15 undertaken to present that and applaud you for your effort in 
16 doing so and my problem is is that as I look through the 
17 file, Mr. Hale, I find that the plea and the standard and the 
18 Rule 11 requirements were met and that I find that the plea 
19 was knowing and voluntarily entered and that based upon that, 
20 that's the standard. 
21 And secondly that the papers that you have filed 
22 with the court don't indicate that there's a valid basis for 
23 withdrawing that plea and I understand that you've got 
24 disagreements with counsel, but I also find that the 
25 assistance that you've enjoyed the assistance of counsel in 
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1 this matter, in fact, two separate attorneys, and that I 
2 don't find in evidence or basis that the counsel has been 
3 ineffective. 
4 So for that basis, Mr. Hale, I'm prepared to deny 
5 your motions to set aside the pleas that you've entered in 
6 this case. I'm prepared to go forward with sentencing. 
7 You're entitled to review the pre-sentence report. You're 
8 entitled to have Mr. Garcia speak on your behalf if you chose 
9 to do so. You're entitled to raise these issues on appeal 
10 and those are all possibilities for you as well, Mr. Hale. 
11 MR. HALE: The motion for notice of appeal right 
12 now I'd like to submit this into the court right now. 
13 THE COURT: Note - what it LS? Notice of appeal? 
14 Okay. And what we need to do to do that we need to take care 
15 of sentencing prior to the time for that. You waive any time 
16 for sentencing; is that correct? 
17 MR. HALE: That is correct. 
18 THE COURT: And you're entitled to review your pre-
19 sentence report prior to the time of sentencing and I'm glad 
20 to have Mr. Garcia speak on your behalf if you wish to have 
21 that as well with regard to sentencing issues. You've seen 
22 the report by AP&P with regard to sentencing? 
23 MR. HALE: Yes, sir, definitely. I'd like to -
24 THE COURT: And you're entitled to speak on your 
25 behalf and I will have Mr. Garcia speak on your behalf if you 
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